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1.  Introduction 
 
The goal of this paper is to characterize and account for the systematic distribution 
of a semantic property, “evaluativity”. A construction is evaluative if it makes 
reference to a degree that exceeds a contextually specified standard. The term 
comes from Neeleman et al. (2004); Seuren (1978) alternatively refers to this 
property as ‘orientedness’ and Bierwisch (1989) as ‘norm-relatedness’. The 
distribution of evaluativity seems to vary with the predicate and quantifier of a 
degree construction. I attempt to explain this distribution in terms of semantic 
properties of predicates and degree quantifiers. 
  Evaluativity is typically associated with positive constructions as in (1): 
 
(1).  a.  Amy is tall.  b.  Amy is a tall woman. 
 
I use the term ‘degree construction’ to refer to any construction that makes 
reference to a degree of gradability or a degree of quantity. I use the term ‘degree 
morphology’ to refer to morphemes that bind or saturate degree variables: 
examples include measure phrases (MPs) like 5ft and degree quantifiers like the 
comparative morpheme –er and the wh-phrase how. 
  A positive construction is a degree construction without any overt degree 
morphology. (1a) is evaluative because it attributes to Amy a height that exceeds a 
relevant standard. This illustrates the context-sensitivity of evaluativity; evaluative 
constructions refer to a standard, and this standard can vary with the context of 
utterance. Amy can be considered tall in one context, e.g. a discussion of 
ballerinas, and short in another, e.g. a discussion of basketball players.1 
  Another property of evaluativity is that it is not part of the meaning of an 
adjective. The fact that a positive construction with the adjective tall is evaluative 
does not bear on the evaluativity of other degree constructions with tall: 
 
(2)  a.   Amy is taller than Betty.   b.  Amy is as tall as Betty. 
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1For a discussion of how this standard is valued, see Kennedy 2007 and references therein. 
                                                    © 2007 by Jessica Rett 
T. Friedman and M. Gibson (eds), SALT XVII 210-227, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityThe comparative in (2a) and the equative in (2b) contain the predicate tall, but 
these sentences are not evaluative. An utterance of e.g. (2b) does not make 
reference to a degree that exceeds a contextual standard: (2b) could felicitously be 
uttered if Amy’s and Betty’s heights were below the relevant standard of tallness. 
  We can test the evaluativity of a degree construction in a general sense by 
determining whether or not it entails its corresponding positive construction 
(Bierwisch 1989). Because evaluativity is context-sensitive, this notion of 
entailment is one that requires holding fixed the context of utterance, and thus the 
contextually-valued standard, across the two constructions:  entails  iff for 
every context c, if  is true at c then so is . We can verify that (2a) is not 
evaluative because it does not entail that Amy (or Betty) is tall. 
  As evaluativity is not a part of the meaning of the predicate in a 
construction, neither is it a part of the meaning of the construction.  
 
(3).  a.  Amy is as tall as Betty.  b.  Amy is as short as Betty. 
 
The equative (3a) is not evaluative, but the equative in (3b) is: it makes reference 
to a contextually salient standard of shortness (and entails that Amy is short). 
  I argue in this paper that the distribution of evaluativity is a product of two 
things: the polarity of the predicate and the nature of the degree quantifier 
(whether it is ‘polar-variant’ or ‘polar-invariant’). I’ll first establish a major 
shortcoming of current accounts of evaluativity, and then propose that evaluativity 
is encoded in a degree modifier, which can optionally occur in any degree 
construction. Section 6 extends the account to antonym pairs that demonstrate 
evaluativity patterns different from tall and short. 
 
 
2. Analyses of Evaluativity 
 
As we have seen above, what seems to be the most simple use of adjectives (the 
positive construction) has an aspect of meaning (evaluativity) that is often lacking 
in more complex constructions like the comparative. The question of how to go 
about encoding evaluativity in the positive construction has thus been centered on 
how to associate the presence of a semantic property with the absence of any 
additional morphology (and, similarly, the absence of a semantic property with the 
presence of additional morphology). 
  The MP construction in (4) has two overt arguments: an individual (the 
subject Amy) and a degree (the MP 5ft). This suggests the semantics for tall in (5); 
I assume here that if x is tall to degree d, then x is tall to degree d – 1. 
 
(4)  Amy is 5ft tall. 
(5)  [[ tall]]    = xd.tall(x,d) 
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1978, Rullman 1995, Heim 2000) and I will use it in what follows. An alternative 
view holds that gradable adjectives are ‘measure functions,’ functions from 
individuals to degrees (Kennedy 1999, 2007, a.o.). A vague predicate analysis 
eliminates reference to degrees entirely, assuming that adjectives are functions 
from objects to truth values on a partitioned contextually-sensitive domain 
(McConnell-Ginet 1973, Kamp 1975, Klein 1980). 
  The apparent correlation between the presence of evaluativity and the 
absence of degree morphology suggests prima facie that an analysis of the positive 
construction should link the two. This has led many to argue that the positive 
construction contains a covert degree phrase (POS). POS simultaneously binds the 
free degree variable and compares the degree to a standard (Bartsch and 
Vennemann 1972, Cresswell 1976, von Stechow 1984, Kennedy 1999). The 
meaning in (6) is one instantiation of POS, based on Cresswell’s analysis. 
 
(6) POS  =  Px∃d.P(x,d) ∧ d > s 
 
  In recent accounts (Kennedy 1999, 2007), POS resides in the head of DegP 
in lieu of an MP. So POS resolves the differences between positive and MP 
constructions at once: it accounts for the difference in overt arguments (it covertly 
binds the degree argument in the positive construction), and it contributes 
evaluativity by restricting the degrees to those high on a scale with respect to a 
standard. POS can’t cooccur with overt degree morphology because both 
operators reside in Deg° and because both operators bind the degree argument. 
  But, as we have seen, it is false that overt degree morphology blocks 
evaluativity. In (3b), the equative construction is evaluative despite the presence 
of the degree quantifier as. A similar pattern is exhibited in degree questions ([+/–
E] marks an evaluative and a non-evaluative construction respectively). 
 
(7)  a.   How tall is Amy?  [–E]  b.  How short is Amy?  [+E] 
 
While the question in (7a) comes with no expectation that Amy be particularly 
tall, the question in (7b) presupposes that Amy is in fact short. 
  The table in (8) is a summary of the distribution of evaluativity in 
constructions with overt degree morphology. Comparative and excessive 
constructions are not evaluative (do not entail that x is A), nor are equatives and 
interrogatives with positive antonyms; but equatives and interrogatives with 
negative antonyms are evaluative. 
  I’ll call those constructions whose evaluativity depends on the polarity of 
the antonym ‘polar-variant’ constructions. Those whose evaluativity does not 
depend on the polarity of the antonym are ‘polar-invariant’. 
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NP1 
 
Amy    EVAL1    
  x      d.tall'(x,d) 
  d.tall'(x,d) ∧ d > s1 
  d.tall'(a,d) ∧ d > s1 
  tall 
(8)  The distribution of evaluativity in constructions with degree morphology 
   
type form tall short ex.
polar-variant equative [−E] [+E] Amy is as tall/short as Betty.
interrogative [−E] [+E] How tall/short is Betty?
polar-invariant excessive [−E] [−E] Amy is too tall/short for her pants.
comparative [−E] [−E] Amy is taller/shorter than Betty.  
 
  It seems then that the POS account does not accurately describe the 
distribution of evaluativity. The data above call for an analysis of evaluativity that 
i) allows for evaluativity to cooccur with overt degree morphology, and ii) can 
account for its absence in constructions with positive-polarity predicates and in 
constructions like the comparative. 
 
 
3.  The Degree Modifier EVAL 
 
We can allow for evaluativity to cooccur with overt degree morphology by 
encoding it in a degree modifier of type d,t,d,t. Because modifiers do not 
change the type of a construction, they can in principle occur optionally in any 
degree construction. 
  Evaluative constructions reference degrees that exceed a standard. So we 
can think of the degree modifier that encodes evaluativity, ‘EVAL’, as a function 
from a set of degrees to a subset of those degrees (the ones above the standard). 
 
(9) EVALi  Dd,td. D(d) ∧ d > si

s is a pragmatic variable, i.e. it is left unbound in the semantics. I assume that each 
instance of EVAL in a sentence introduces a single pragmatic variable. 
  The tree below demonstrates how EVAL can contribute evaluativity to the 
positive construction (I have yet to argue for why it must): 
 
(10)  a.  Amy is tall. 
 b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This derivation results in a set of degrees. I assume that, in lieu of an overt 
quantifier or modifier, the free variable d is bound by existential closure, resulting 
in the proposition that Amy is tall to a degree which exceeds the relevant standard 
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sentence in (10) as involving quantification over degrees is to prevent its 
compatibility with degree quantifiers and modifiers (Doetjes 1997). 
  Following Bhatt & Pancheva (2004) a.o., the subject Amy is base-
generated in the functional projection “aP,” which takes AP as its complement. 
Given a situation in which Amy is 5ft tall and the standard of tallness applicable 
to Amy is 3ft, then the argument of EVAL in (10b) includes the degrees 1ft, 2ft, 
3ft, 4ft, 5ft, and the value includes 4ft, 5ft but not degrees below 4ft (the sets are 
dense). This allows two different mechanisms for resolving the two differences 
between the constructions in (4): the difference in arguments is resolved by 
existential closure, and the difference in evaluativity is resolved by EVAL. 
 
 
4. The Distribution of EVAL 
 
The characterization of EVAL as a degree modifier predicts that it can take any 
set of degrees as its argument. Due to the fact that EVAL is phonologically covert, 
this leads to a state of affairs in which any degree construction can in principle 
have an evaluative or non-evaluative interpretation. When either interpretation is 
available, the construction is [–E]. When the non-evaluative interpretation is 
blocked, the construction is [+E].   
  As (8) suggests, there are two semantic aspects of degree constructions 
that conspire to determine whether or not that construction receives an evaluative 
interpretation: 1) the polarity of the predicate in the construction, and 2) whether 
or not the construction is polar-invariant. I’ll review the significance of these 
properties and discuss how they effect evaluativity in constructions with overt 
degree morphology, and then in positive constructions (Section 4.3). 
 
4.1.  Polarity 
 
It has been widely observed that two antonyms (e.g. tall and short) make use of 
the same scale, but in reverse directions (Cresswell 1976, Seuren 1984, von 
Stechow 1984, Bierwisch 1989, Kennedy 1999). The fact that tall and short differ 
only in their ordering is illustrated by the following entailment patterns: 
 
(11)  a.  Amy is taller than Betty.     Amy is not shorter than Betty.
  b.   Amy is shorter than Betty.   Amy is not taller than Betty. 
 
In (11), the comparative form with the positive antonym tall entails the negation 
of the one with the negative antonym short, and vice-versa.  
  I assume here with Bartsch & Vennemann (1972) and Bierwisch (1989) 
that adjectival scales are triples D,<Υ, with D a set of degrees, <Υ a total 
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ordering on D, and  a dimension (e.g. ‘height’). Antonym scales are illustrated in 
Figure 1 for the antonyms tall and short: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Amy’s height 
 
  I will represent a set of degrees associated with the predicate tall as Dtall 
and so forth. Assuming that Amy is 5ft tall, we can represent Amy’s height as it is 
reflected on the ‘tall’ scale as well as on the ‘short’ scale: 
 
(12)  a.  Amy’s tallness: {1ft, 2ft, 3ft, 4ft, 5ft}tall 
  b.   Amy’s shortness: {5ft, 6ft, 7ft, 8ft, 9ft, …}short 
 
Notice that the set of degrees to which Amy is tall and the set of degrees to which 
Amy is short have an endpoint in common. This is a factor of their antonymy. 
 
(13)   For all adjectives A, A' and for all x in the domain of A, A', 
  A and A' are antonyms iff:  MAX [A(x)] =  MAX [A' (x)] 
  ∧ A(x)  A'(x) = {MAX (A(x))}, 
 Where  MAX is defined relative to the direction of the scale: 
(14) Let  D be a set of degrees ordered by the relation <Υ, then 
 M AX(D) = d[d ∈ D ∧ ∀d' ∈ D [d' Υ d ] ] 
 
The fact that the two antonyms share an endpoint and are otherwise complements 
is one important characteristic of antonyms for evaluativity: we can reliably infer 
from Amy’s tallness to Amy’s shortness, and vice-versa. 
  A second important characteristic of antonyms is the fact that negative 
antonyms are marked with respect to positive ones. To support this claim, I will 
review some distributional data; for more explanatory accounts (ones that 
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Lyons (1977), Rullman (1995) and Heim (2007). 
  Lyons says, “We tend to say that small things lack size, that what is 
required is less height, and so on, rather than that large things lack smallness and 
that what is required is more lowness” (Lyons 1977: 275). The conclusion that 
follows is that, e.g., “long is unmarked with respect to short because it occurs in a 
variety of expressions from which short is excluded” (Cruse 1986: 173). (15) 
shows that some positive antonyms can occur with measure phrases, but their 
negative counterparts cannot; (16) shows that positive antonyms but not negative 
ones can have nominal forms.  
 
(15)  a.   This one is 10ft long.  (16)  a.   What is its length? 
  b.  *This one is 10ft short.   b.  *What is its shortness? 
 
Also see Higgins (1977) for a psycholinguistic study of the interpretational 
differences between marked and unmarked adjectives in comparatives. Both 
properties of polar antonyms play a role in the distribution of evaluativity. 
 
4.2.  Polar-(In)Variance 
 
This section examines polar-(in)variance by studying relevant semantic properties 
of the comparative and equative constructions as a case study. The generalizations 
made here can be extended to other polar-(in)variant degree constructions. 
  Equatives are polar-variant while comparatives are polar-invariant. A 
symptom of this difference is the difference in the entailment patterns of these two 
constructions. For a polar-variant construction, the negative-antonym form entails 
its positive-antonym counterpart (17a);2 for a polar-invariant construction, the 
negative-antonym form does not entail its positive-antonym counterpart (17b) 
 
(17)  a.  Amy is as short as Betty.    Amy is as tall as Betty. 
  b.  Amy is shorter than Betty.    Amy is taller than Betty. 
 
  These entailment patterns are due to the fact that the negative-polarity 
form in (17a) is true if two conditions hold: i) that Amy and Betty are the same 
height, and ii) that Amy and Betty are short. The positive-polarity form in (17a) is 
true only if one condition holds: that Amy and Betty are the same height. In 
contrast, for the negative form in (17b) to be true, Betty’s height needs to exceed 
Amy’s height; and for the positive form in (17b) to be true, Amy’s height needs to 
exceed Betty’s height. The difference can be summarized as follows: for polar-
variant constructions, the truth conditions of a negative form are a subset of the 
                                                 
2This is true for how many questions as well, assuming the semantics of questions from 
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984) in which a question Q1 entails a question Q2 iff the denotation of 
Q1 is a subset of the denotation of Q2. Thus How short is Amy?  How tall is Amy? 
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constructions, the truth conditions of a negative-antonym form and its positive-
antonym counterpart are contradictory.3  
  Because of the nature of EVAL (9), the analysis presented here predicts 
that each degree construction has an evaluative and a non-evaluative interpretation 
available. I’ll first examine polar-variant constructions by discussing what it 
means for the equative to be polar-variant. 
 
(18)  Amy is as tall as Betty. 
 a.  NON-EVALUATIVE: {d:tall'(a,d)} = {d:tall'(bd)} 
 b.    EVALUATIVE: {d:tall'(a,d) ∧ d > s} = {d:tall'(b,d) ∧ d > s} 
(19)  Amy is as short as Betty. 
 a.  NON-EVALUATIVE: {d:short'(a,d)} = {d:short'(bd)} 
 b.    EVALUATIVE: {d:short'(a,d) ∧ d > s	
} = {d:short'(b,d) ∧ d > s	
} 
 
Here I crucially take the bare equative to have an ‘exactly’ interpretation, rather 
than an ‘at least’ interpretation. I’ll return to this assumption in §7. I also assume a 
general presupposition that the sets above are non-empty. 
  Important for the distribution of evaluativity is that the two non-evaluative 
interpretations, (18a) and (19a), mean the same thing (are mutually entailing). 
(18a) says that Amy’s and Betty’s heights are at the same point on the ‘short’ 
scale. Given what we know about the relationship between the ‘tall’ and ‘short’ 
scales, we can infer that for Amy and Betty to satisfy the truth conditions of (18a) 
is for Amy and Betty to satisfy the truth conditions of (19a). The synonymy of the 
two non-evaluative interpretations is a factor of the first characteristic of polar 
antonyms (that we can infer from one scale to the other). 
  The two evaluative interpretations, (18b) and (19b), do not have the same 
meaning because they make reference to the ‘tall’ and ‘short’ standards 
respectively. (18b) says that Amy and Betty are of equal height and are tall; (19b) 
says that Amy and Betty are of equal height and are short. Given that (18a) and 
(19a) have the same truth conditions, and given a (universal) principle that tells 
speakers to avoid using a marked form whenever possible, only the positive-
antonym version of the two non-evaluative forms is available. This is an effect of 
the second characteristic of polar antonyms. 
 
(20)  Amy is as tall as Betty.    NON-EVALUATIVE 
         E VALUATIVE 
(21)  Amy is as short as Betty.    NON-EVALUATIVE 
         E VALUATIVE 
 
                                                 
3For quantifiers like the comparative and the equative, which take two sets of degrees as 
arguments, polar-(in)variance could have to do with whether or not the quantifier is symmetric (i.e. 
whether Q(A)(B) Q(B)(A). However, this property cannot be generalized to how A, which 
displays polar-(in)variance despite its only taking one set of degrees as its argument. 
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Amy is short, as it is unambiguous and the proposition expressed is evaluative. 
From Amy is as tall as Betty, we can’t conclude that Amy is tall because this 
sentence could be expressing the meaning in (18a), which is unevaluative. 
  The situation differs for polar-invariant constructions, which I’ll discuss 
by examining the comparative. For polar-invariant constructions, the non-
evaluative positive-antonym interpretation (22a) and the non-evaluative negative-
antonym interpretation (23a) do not have the same truth conditions. 
 
(22)  Amy is taller than Betty. 
 a.  NON-EVALUATIVE: {d:tall'(a,d)} ⊃ {d:tall'(b,d)} 
 b.  EVALUATIVE: {d:tall'(a,d) ∧ d > s} ⊃ {d:tall'(b,d) ∧ d > s} 
(23)  Amy is shorter than Betty. 
 a.  NON-EVALUATIVE: {d:short'(a,d)} ⊃ {d:short'(b,d)} 
 b.  EVALUATIVE: {d:short'(a,d) ∧ d > s	
} ⊃ {d:short'(b,d) ∧ d > s	
} 
 
  Unlike polar-variant forms, polar-invariant constructions with different 
antonyms differ in more than just their evaluativity. With both interpretations of 
each comparative, for (22) to be true, (23) must be false and vice-versa. This 
means that the non-evaluative negative-antonym form is not blocked, and both 
constructions can have either meaning. 
 
(24)  Amy is taller than Betty.       NON-EVALUATIVE 
               E VALUATIVE 
(25)  Amy is shorter than Betty.       NON-EVALUATIVE 
            EVALUATIVE 
 
  This analysis crucially assumes that a [–E] construction can – but need not 
– have an evaluative interpretation. This is a harmless assumption. There are two 
possible situations in which an ambiguous degree construction (let’s use Amy is as 
tall as Betty) could be uttered. The first is one in which the hearer knows that 
Amy or Betty are tall relative to the contextually-valued standard. In this case, he 
can interpret the utterance to have an evaluative interpretation without running 
into any problems. The second situation is one in which the hearer does not know 
whether Amy or Betty are tall, in which case he can interpret the utterance to have 
a non-evaluative interpretation. 
  The availability of an evaluative interpretation for a [–E] construction 
surfaces in some constructions, although I do not have anything to say on which 
constructions and why. Below is a construction in which a [–E] form – a positive-
antonym question – is directly juxtaposed with its negative-antonym counterpart. 
 
(26)  a.   I don’t know how tall or short Amy is. 
  b.  I don’t know whether Amy is tall or short (or the extent to which). 
218 Jessica RettAn intuitive gloss of (26a) is (26b), which gives the positive-polarity question an 
evaluative reading. This, I think, speaks in favor of a theory which allows [–E] to 
be optionally evaluative.4  
  To summarize, the distribution of evaluativity among constructions with 
overt degree morphology is determined by two factors exhibited by the degree 
construction: the polarity of the predicate, and whether or not the construction is 
polar-variant. If it is polar-variant, the positive-polarity and negative-polarity 
forms differ only insofar as they refer to a contextual standard, rendering a short 
non-evaluative interpretation synonymous to a tall non-evaluative interpretation. 
This makes these readings subject to a markedness competition and so the non-
evaluative reading of the short form is blocked by its tall counterpart. As a result, 
negative-polarity polar-variant constructions are [+E], while positive-polarity 
polar-variant constructions, as well as polar-invariant constructions, are [–E]. 
 
4.3.  The Positive Construction 
 
I demonstrated in §3 that EVAL can contribute to the semantics of the positive 
construction, but not that it needs to. The theory as I’ve spelled it out predicts that 
each of the positive constructions in (27) and (28) can have two possible readings. 
 
(27)  Amy is tall. 
 a.  NON-EVALUATIVE:  ∃d.tall'(a,d) 
 b.  EVALUATIVE: ∃d.tall'(a,d) ∧ d > s 
(28)  Amy is short. 
 a.  NON-EVALUATIVE: ∃d.short'(a,d) 
 b.  EVALUATIVE: ∃d.short'(a,d) ∧ d > s	
 
 
However, these non-evaluative readings do not seem to be available. Positive 
constructions, as we’ve seen, seem to always be evaluative. Notice though that the 
non-evaluative interpretations both assert something very trivial about Amy: that 
she has a height (a degree of tallness and shortness, respectively). We can imagine 
that such an interpretation is out for pragmatic reasons, making the evaluative 
interpretation of the positive construction much more salient. 
  There are in fact instances of the positive construction being given a non-
evaluative interpretation. In ‘exceed’ comparatives, the positive form introduces 
the scale on which the two arguments are being compared.5 
 
(29)  Mti   hu  ni  mrefu  ku -shinda   ule      Swahili (Stassen 1985: 43) 
 tree  this    is  big    INF -exceed  that 
  ‘This tree is taller than that tree.’ 
                                                 
4Remember that EVAL occurs with sets of degrees, so each adjective in (26b) introduces a 
distinct and co-indexed EVAL (and has a corresponding contextual standard).  
5Thanks to Pam Munro and Russ Schuh for pointing out the significance of this data. 
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to the comparative construction by establishing the dimension of measurement on 
which the ‘exceed’ relation is calculated. Despite this, (29) can receive a non-
evaluative reading, just like English comparatives. It can be used to discuss the 
heights of two relatively short trees. 
  On the other hand, this explanation for the evaluativity of the positive 
form predicts that any positive construction can have a non-evaluative 
interpretation whenever this reading is not trivial. For instance, it predicts that the 
sentence Sue is (once again) heavy/light can be meaningfully uttered to describe 
the absence of weightlessness after Sue’s reentrance into the Earth’s atmosphere, 
despite Sue being relatively light, or the lightest of the astronauts on the mission. 
  Although my intuitions waiver, I suspect that this construction cannot be 
so used. If that is the case, then it is possible that the restriction against using 
positive constructions could be due to a general pragmatic preference against 
ambiguity. In the astronaut example, then, the use of Sue is heavy to describe her 
absence of weightlessness is blocked by e.g. the less ambiguous Sue (once again) 
has a weight, although this is not an entirely satisfactory explanation. 
  The general conundrum is this: both positive constructions and 
constructions with overt degree morphology exhibit evaluativity. The positive 
construction seems to do so obligatorily – with a few exceptions, i.e. (29) – and 
constructions with overt degree morphology seem to do so optionally. A general 
account of evaluativity, then, has to decide which is a primary characteristic of 
evaluativity and which is secondary. I am confident given the discussion above 
that a successful analysis of evaluativity characterizes it as optional and derives 
any obligatoriness secondarily, via pragmatics. 
  There is one other way in which the manifestation of evaluativity differs in 
the positive construction from constructions with overt degree morphology: in the 
type of meaning it contributes. For all intents and purposes, evaluativity in the 
positive construction is assertive: it can be directly denied (30), and it does not 
project out of the antecedent of a counterfactual (31) 
 
(30)  a.  Amy is tall. 
  b.  No, she’s not, she’s below the average height for women her age. 
(31)  If Amy were tall, she would be a supermodel.    Amy is tall. 
 
  This appears to be incompatible with the type of meaning contributed by 
constructions with overt degree morphology; for these constructions, evaluativity 
seems to be presuppositional. 
 
(32)  A: Amy is as short as Betty. 
  B:   No, she’s not, she’s taller than Betty. 
  B':*No, she’s not, she’s actually taller than the average height. 
(33)  If Amy were as short as Betty, she would not win.  Betty is short. 
220 Jessica RettThis is another instance in which evaluativity behaves differently for the two 
different sorts of constructions, and an optimal solution would be able to derive 
one behavior from the other. I take evaluativity to be assertive, staying true to its 
behavior in the positive construction. As I’ve defined the comparative and the 
equative – in terms of relations between sets of degrees – the fact that evaluativity 
comes out as a presupposition in these constructions falls out of the semantics of 
degree quantifiers and a presupposition that the sets of degrees are non-empty.6 
  To sum up, evaluativity in the positive construction differs from 
evaluativity in constructions with overt degree morphology. These differences can 
be reconciled by assuming that the positive construction is [–E], but is almost 
always interpreted as evaluative for pragmatic reasons; and that evaluativity is 
assertive, but passes presupposition tests in constructions with overt degree 
morphology because of the semantics of these quantifiers. 
 
 
5.  Localizing the Competition 
 
The analysis above relies on the notion of semantic competition to determine 
which forms can enter a markedness competition. I’ve assumed above that 
semantic competition occurs between two mutually entailing expressions. This is 
what allows for markedness to effect the evaluativity of polar-variant forms. The 
theory as it stands incorrectly predicts that (34a) and (34b) enter into a semantic 
competition. 
 
(34)  a.  Amy is shorter than Betty. 
  b.   Betty is taller than Amy. 
 
These two forms differ in the polarity of their predicate and the value of their 
individual arguments. They are mutually entailing. The fact that (34a) includes the 
predicate  short means that it is more marked than (34b). The analysis above 
predicts, then, that the non-evaluative interpretation of (34b) suffices to block the 
non-evaluative interpretation of (34a), which would render (34a) evaluative. This 
is the wrong prediction. For some reason, the relationship between (34a) and 
(34b) doesn’t result in a semantic competition for the purpose of evaluativity. 
  It seems reasonable to conclude that this difference (the fact that 34a,b 
don’t result in a competition but 22,23 do) is correlated with the fact that (34a,b) 
differ from each other additionally in the order of their arguments. The same sort 
                                                 
6(33) demonstrates that only the evaluativity of the degree clause (Betty’s height) is projected 
in an if-clause. Even though the semantics of the equative asserts that Amy and Betty are the same 
height, this is an asymmetry. This may be due to the fact that the degree clause itself is 
presuppositional, rendering the evaluativity in the degree clause part of a larger presupposition. 
Thanks to Roger Schwarzschild for this idea; see von Stechow (1984) for an analysis of the 
comparative compatible with this suggestion. 
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  tall 
t
 
Deg' 
of problem can arise with tests for the monotonicity of an argument of an 
individual quantifier. To test e.g. the left argument, the quantifier and its right 
argument need to be held fixed while the left argument is changed. To vary the 
left argument and e.g. the quantifier is to render the test ineffective.  
  We can imagine that the same sort of test holds for testing the polar-
(in)variance of a quantifier: a competition that crucially involves the polar-
(in)variance of a quantifier needs to be constrained in such a way that its 
arguments are held constant and only the quantifier is varied. We can do this by 
localizing the competition to a subcomponent of the degree construction: one that 
minimally involves the quantifier and the predicate. 
  Assuming a structure in which the quantifier and predicate form a 
constituent (Abney 1987, Larson 1988, Corver 1997, Kennedy 1999, Grosu & 
Horvath 2006), the compositional semantics are as follows: 
 
(35) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is not an evaluative expression, but if it were,  marks where EVAL would 
be located in the tree. 
  This configuration gives us a way of isolating the effects of the degree 
quantifier and the predicate. We can restrict the semantic competition from 
equivalent CPs to equivalent Deg's. Establishing semantic equivalence between 
Deg's requires a generalized notion of entailment: 
 
(36)  ∀f,g ∈ D: f  g iff ∀x ∈ D, f(x)  g(x) 
 
The two equatives Amy is as short as Betty and Amy is as tall as Betty, for 
instance, can enter into a semantic competition in this new sense because their 
DegPs are mutually entailing in a generalized sense. 
 
222 Jessica Rett(37) a.    λD[{d:short'(x,d)} = D]   λD[{d:tall'(x,d)} = D] 
 b.  λD[{d:short'(x,d)} ⊃ D]   λD[{d:tall'(x,d)} ⊃ D] 
  
   Because this theory differentiates between sets of ‘tall’ degrees and sets of 
‘short’  degrees, the two Deg's in (37a) aren’t equivalent. If Amy is 5ft tall, 
remember, her ‘tall’ degrees are {1ft, 2ft, 3ft, 4ft, 5ft} and her ‘short’ degrees are 
{5ft,6ft,7ft,8ft,…}	
. However, the fact that tall and short are polar antonyms 
enables us to infer from x’s degrees of tallness to x’s degrees of shortness. In this 
sense, then, the set of degrees that are equal to x’s ‘short’ degrees mutually entails 
(in a general sense) the set of degrees that are equal to x’s ‘tall’ degrees. Not so for 
polar-invariant constructions like the comparative, in (37b): despite any inference 
from ‘short’ degrees to ‘tall’ degrees, the two Deg's in (37b) are not mutually 
entailing. 
  Localizing the competition in this way has the added benefit of accounting 
for the perhaps surprising evaluativity of modified equatives.7 
 
(38)  a.   Amy is at least as short as Betty. 
       b.   Amy is almost as short as Betty. 
 
The sentences in (38) are evaluative, presumably because they involve the 
quantifier as. However, the fact that they are modified e.g. by at least means that, 
semantically, they are more like the comparative (the proposition Amy is at least 
as short as Betty, even under the ‘exactly’ semantics of the equative, does not 
mutually entail Amy is at least as tall as Betty). The current account captures the 
intuition that all equatives are evaluative, regardless of how they are modified, by 
restricting the competition to the Deg'.8 
  To summarize: the previous section described the distribution of 
evaluativity in terms of a competition, which dealt with entailment at the 
propositional level. The pair in (34), along with the evaluativity of modified 
equatives like Amy is at least as tall as Betty, demonstrate that the competition 
needs to be localized. Given that the two factors that determine the distribution of 
evaluativity are the polarity of the predicate and the polar-(in)variance of the 
quantifier, I've reasoned that the area of localization is the Deg' in which the 
predicate and quantifier form a constituent. Adapting the notion of generalized 
                                                 
7Thanks to Hans Kamp (p.c.) for bringing this problem to my attention. 
8Daniel Büring (p.c.) has pointed out that factor modifiers differ from e.g. at least and almost 
in that they don't preserve the ealuativity of [+E] constructions. 
 
(i) Amy is twice as short as Betty, but neither woman is short. 
 
This seems to be evidence that factor modifiers are base-generated in Deg' and, unlike at least and 
almost, can effect the semantics of the construction for the competition. I do not currently know 
enough about the syntax and semantics of factor modifiers to be able to explain this very 
interesting difference. 
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between polar antonyms is sufficient to preserve the results that made the 
proposition-level account successful. 
 
 
6.  A Typology of Gradable Adjectives 
 
Until now, the main focus of this paper has been the distribution of evaluativity 
among degree constructions with the antonyms tall and short. With these 
antonyms, degree constructions display the evaluativity pattern shown in (8); 
however, the presence of different types of antonyms effects the pattern of 
evaluativity across degree constructions. 
 
(39)  a.  Amy is taller than Betty.   Amy is tall. 
  b.  Amy is shorter than Betty. Amy is short. 
(40)  a.  This glass is cleaner than that glass.    This glass is clean. 
  b.   This glass is dirtier than that glass.      This glass is dirty. 
(41)  a.  This glass is more opaque than that glass.    This glass is opaque. 
 b.    This glass is more transparent than that glass.  This glass is transparent. 
 
  Looking at just the comparative construction for simplicity’s sake, we get 
three different patterns: 1) antonyms like tall and short whose comparative forms 
are never evaluative; 2) antonyms like clean and dirty whose positive comparative 
form is not evaluative, but whose negative comparative form is; and 3) antonyms 
like opaque and transparent, whose comparative forms are both evaluative. 
  Rotstein & Winter (2004) and Kennedy & McNally (2005) observe that 
scales associated with different gradable adjectives differ in scale structure: they 
can have only a lower bound, only an upper bound, be completely open or 
completely closed. 
 
(42)  Open scales  
  a.  ??perfectly/??slightly tall    b.  ??perfectly/??slightly short 
(43)  Lower/upper closed scales 
  a.  ??perfectly/slightly dirty  b.    perfectly/??slightly clean 
(44)  Closed scales 
  a.  perfectly/slightly opaque  b.  perfectly/slightly transparent 
 
  In relation to these scale structures, Kennedy (2007) postulates an 
economy principle: “Maximize the contribution of the conventional meanings of 
the elements of a sentence to the computation of its truth conditions.” The 
assumption of this economy principle explains the connection between these 
predicates’ scale structures and evaluativity patterns: because the scales associated 
224 Jessica Rettwith e.g. tall and short lack bounds, their standards must be contextually 
determined. Adjectives associated with bounded scales have natural standards in 
their endpoints, and these become the value of the standard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scale structures and standard placement 
 
  If we assume that EVAL has the same optional distribution, the 
evaluativity patterns demonstrated in (42) through (44) fall out of the different 
structures of the scales associated with the predicates. Constructions with closed-
scale adjectives (44) and lower-bound adjectives (43a) are always evaluative 
because their standard always corresponds to their lower bound: to be on the scale 
is to be above the standard on the scale, with or without EVAL. Constructions 
with upper-bound adjectives (43b) are never evaluative because their standards 
are set at their upper bound. To be on the scale is to be below the standard on the 
scale, with or without EVAL. This demonstrates that a degree-modifier analysis of 
evaluativity can account for the distribution of evaluativity across all gradable 
predicates: the distribution of EVAL is held constant, but its effects differ based 
on the structure of the scale invoked by the construction.9 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
I have shown that the distribution of evaluativity is too wide to be accounted for 
with a morpheme that is in complementary distribution with overt degree 
morphology (e.g. POS). However, the distribution of evaluativity is too narrow to 
be accounted for with a degree modifier like EVAL, unless we make additional 
assumptions about polarity and polar-invariance. The polar-(in)variance of a 
quantifier determines whether or not the polarity of the predicate will affect a 
construction’s non-evaluative interpretations. 
                                                 
9‘Extreme adjectives’ (Paradis 2001) are those like gorgeous and brilliant which behave like 
closed-scale and lower-bound adjectives in being evaluative even in comparative constructions. I 
assume that this is because they are associated with subscales of those scales like ‘pretty’ and 
‘smart,’ which gives them a natural lower bound like these other predicates. 
s 
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weak reading) or an ‘exactly’ reading (a strong reading). From Horn (1972): 
 
(45)  Amy is as tall as Betty. 
  a.  No, she’s not, she’s taller.   b.  Yes, in fact, she’s taller. 
 
The traditional way to derive a weak/strong ambiguity is to assign the form the 
weak reading and to derive the strong reading pragmatically, via scalar 
implicature (however, see Fox 2006). 
  Where evaluativity is concerned, the issue is simple: equatives and 
comparatives simply behave differently with respect to evaluativity, and we can 
give a good account of why equatives pattern with questions rather than with the 
comparative if we assume it has an ‘exactly’ meaning (or a still weaker meaning 
which can become either ‘exactly’ or ‘at least’ with the presence of a modifier, as 
in Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002 and Bhatt & Pancheva 2007). Whatever the 
solution is, I believe that the distribution of evaluativity and the encouraging 
success of this analysis suggests that we have an empirical reason to distance the 
equative from its ‘at least’ interpretation. 
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